Most philosophical discussion of connectionism has focused upon the issue of whether it can replace, in whole or in part, the classic computational conception of the mind. The problems that have been of central concern include: what are, or what should be, the assumptions that are fundamental to the
I. Overview.- Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview.- II. Connectionism vs. Classical Cognitive Science.- Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition.- Connectionism and the Notion of Levels.- Representation and Rule-Instantiation in Connectionist Systems.- What Connectionists Cannot Do: The Threat to Classical AI.- III. Connectionism and Conditioning.- Connectionism in Pavlovian Harness.- Connectionism and Conditioning.- IV. Does Cognition Require Syntactically Structured Representations?.- Systematicity, Structured Representations and Cognitive Architecture: A Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.- An Explanatory Budget for Connectionism and Eliminativism.- Settling into a New Paradigm.- Putting a Price on Cognition.- V. Can Connectionism Provide Syntactically Structured Representations?.- The Constituent Structure of Connectionist Mental States: A Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.- Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism.- Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work.- Classical Questions, Radical Answers: Connectionism and the Structure of Mental Representations.- Connectionism versus Symbolism in High-Level Cognition.- VI. Connectionism and Philosophy.- Connectionism and the Specter of Representationalism.- Is Perception Cognitively Mediated.- Leaping to Conclusions: Connectionism, Consciousness, and the Computational Mind.- Name Index.
Series: Studies in Cognitive Systems
Number Of Pages: 473
Published: October 1991
Country of Publication: NL
Dimensions (cm): 23.5 x 15.5
Weight (kg): 1.9