| Preface | p. xii |
| Acknowledgements | p. xiv |
| The problem of knowledge | p. 1 |
| Knowledge as justified true belief | p. 2 |
| Some objections to the justified true belief account | p. 5 |
| Dogmatism, scepticism and infinite regresses | p. 10 |
| Stopping the regresses: empiricism and rationalism | p. 13 |
| Scepticism under attack | p. 19 |
| Is scepticism consistent? | p. 19 |
| Is scepticism impractical? | p. 23 |
| Does scepticism matter? | p. 25 |
| Scepticism regarding the senses | p. 30 |
| Sextus Empiricus versus empiricism | p. 30 |
| An Aristotelian reply | p. 35 |
| How belief and experience interact | p. 37 |
| The problem of perceptual error | p. 43 |
| Bacon's cure | p. 48 |
| Observation is theory-laden | p. 54 |
| Empiricist psychology | p. 60 |
| The bucket theory of the mind | p. 62 |
| Tradition and the importance of language | p. 63 |
| Language learning | p. 68 |
| The role of repetition | p. 72 |
| Innate ideas or inborn know-how? | p. 75 |
| Idea-ism, appearance and reality | p. 85 |
| A new empiricism--idea-ism | p. 85 |
| Reifying the data | p. 89 |
| The causal theory of perception and the time-lapse argument | p. 91 |
| The sceptic fights back--appearance and reality again | p. 99 |
| Primary and secondary qualities | p. 107 |
| The distinction before Locke | p. 108 |
| Locke's theory | p. 112 |
| Are secondary qualities subjective? | p. 116 |
| Berkeley's critique of Locke | p. 118 |
| Berkeley: idea-ism becomes idealism | p. 121 |
| How to turn appearance into reality | p. 121 |
| Immaterialism | p. 126 |
| God and other minds | p. 132 |
| Immaterialism, phenomenalism and science | p. 140 |
| Hume: idea-ism becomes irrationalism | p. 145 |
| Hume's irrationalism | p. 145 |
| Hume and external objects | p. 147 |
| Hume's inductive scepticism | p. 151 |
| Countering Hume on induction | p. 157 |
| The appeal to inductive principles | p. 157 |
| Probabilism | p. 161 |
| The 'No true Scotsman' ploy | p. 166 |
| Non-deductivism | p. 169 |
| Deductivism | p. 170 |
| The rationalist alternative | p. 176 |
| The rationalist paradigm--Euclid | p. 177 |
| Why mathematical knowledge is a problem for empiricists | p. 181 |
| Three sceptical objections | p. 190 |
| Rationalism defended: Descartes | p. 194 |
| Systematic doubt and the Cogito | p. 195 |
| Metaphysical doubt and the evil genius | p. 202 |
| God and the Cartesian circle | p. 205 |
| Kant and the synthetic a priori | p. 212 |
| Kant's question | p. 212 |
| Kant's answer | p. 214 |
| Kant's idealism | p. 219 |
| Alternative geometries | p. 224 |
| How non-Euclidean geometries were invented | p. 224 |
| Why non-Euclidean geometries are philosophically important | p. 232 |
| Logical empiricists take comfort | p. 235 |
| Platonism and logicism about mathematics | p. 241 |
| Truth and truth-theories | p. 247 |
| The problem of truth and its common-sense solution | p. 247 |
| Subjective truth-theories | p. 249 |
| Tarski's T-scheme | p. 256 |
| Conceptual idealism | p. 263 |
| The liar paradox and Godel's incompleteness theorem | p. 269 |
| Fallibilist realism | p. 274 |
| Sophisticated indirect realism about perception | p. 274 |
| Scepticism, irrationalism and fallibilism | p. 280 |
| Fallibilism and the grue problem | p. 287 |
| New objections | p. 294 |
| Conjectural knowledge | p. 298 |
| References | p. 301 |
| Index | p. 307 |
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