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Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States : Organizational Response to Market Inefficiencies - Helmut M. Dietl

Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States

Organizational Response to Market Inefficiencies

Hardcover

Published: 16th July 2005
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Why did financial keiretsu develop in Japan, but not in Germany and the United States? Why is bank intermediation more dominant in Germany and Japan than in the United States? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each system?
Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States answers these and related questions. Helmut Dietl explains capital market intermediation, holding companies, multidivisional organizations, financial keiretsu, and LBO associations as organizational responses to capital market inefficiencies. Country-specific responses are described as a consequence of country-specific financial regulations. Each regulatory regime results in specific capital market inefficiencies. Comparative capital market and corporate data highlight the major strengths and weaknesses of each system. This book provides a comprehensive and innovative analysis of German, Japanese and U.S. regulations.

Acknowledgementsp. viii
Introductionp. 1
Theoretical Frameworkp. 4
Empirical Evidence from Germany, Japan and the United Statesp. 111
Summaryp. 161
Appendicesp. 166
Notesp. 170
Bibliographyp. 182
Name Indexp. 190
Subject Indexp. 193
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780415171885
ISBN-10: 0415171881
Series: Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy
Audience: Tertiary; University or College
Format: Hardcover
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 212
Published: 16th July 2005
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 21.6 x 14.0  x 1.6
Weight (kg): 0.39
Edition Number: 1