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Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government : Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions - Michael Laver

Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

By: Michael Laver (Editor), Kenneth A. Shepsle (Editor)

Paperback Published: 6th February 1995
ISBN: 9780521438377
Number Of Pages: 332

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One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from-and is politically responsible to-the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgment on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this. Leading specialists on institutional politics in the major parliamentary democracies have been encouraged to describe legislative- executive interactions in terms of a common theoretical framework. The country-specific chapters have, as their central themes, cabinet decision making and cabinet relationships with the parliament, parliamentary parties, and the permanent civil service. The editors have provided a theoretical overview at the outset and, in their conclusion, have made theoretical sense of the empirical variation in parliamentary practices.

List of tables and figures
Series editors'
Preface
Introduction
Cabinet ministers and governmnet formation in parliamentary democracies
Coalition Systems
Models of government and the Australian cabinet Wolfgang
The political role of Norwegian cabinet ministers
The Netherlands: ministers and cabinet policy
The political role of cabinet ministers in Irel
Finland: ministerial autonomy, constitutional collectivism, and party oligarchy
Cabinet ministers and policy-making in Belgium: the impact of coalition constraints
The role of cabinet ministers in the French Fourth Republic
The political autonomy of cabinet ministers in the French Fifth Republic
The role of German ministers in cabinet decision making Ferdin
Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government in Sweden
The political role of cabinet ministers in Italy
Majority Party Government Systems
Ministerial autonomy in Britain
Collective cabinet decision making in New Zeal
The interpersonal dynamics of decision making in Canadian provincial cabinets
Cabinet decision making in the Hellenic Republic 1974-1992
Cabinet government in theoretical perspective
Index
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521438377
ISBN-10: 0521438373
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 332
Published: 6th February 1995
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.6 x 15.1  x 1.6
Weight (kg): 0.49