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Applied Industrial Economics - Louis Phlips

Applied Industrial Economics

By: Louis Phlips (Editor)

Paperback Published: 23rd November 1998
ISBN: 9780521629546
Number Of Pages: 456

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An important collection of papers published over the last ten years in American and European journals. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area.

Market Structure
Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview
Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article
Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry
Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries
Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - a shakeouta or astakeouta
Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes
Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly
Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy
Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies
Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producersa competition
Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market
Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion
Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly
Competition Policy
Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation
Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy
Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD
Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers
Mergers and Merger Control
Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis
Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment
Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply
Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgewortha's paradox of taxation
Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines
Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521629546
ISBN-10: 0521629543
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 456
Published: 23rd November 1998
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.8 x 15.2  x 2.3
Weight (kg): 0.89

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