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Antitrust Law : Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution - Keith N. Hylton

Antitrust Law

Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

Paperback

Published: 7th April 2003
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This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.

'... this book is, quite simply, the best I have ever encountered to deal with US law. It is, in a nutshell, superb, and I wish it had been published six months ago.' European Competition Law Review Advance praise: 'This book is the single best one-volume discussion of modern antitrust law available. It is encyclopaedic in coverage, but deeper than a treatise because it is informed at every step with the best and most systematic of current economic and legal analysis. If you want to learn (or to learn more) about modern antitrust law, read this book.' George Priest, Yale Law School 'An excellent treatment of antitrust law. It should appeal to audiences in economics as well as law. The economic analysis will enable lawyers to understand and address all of the policy options, and to be able to analyze antitrust issues more completely and more persuasively. Keith Hylton is a well-known and respected scholar in this field.' Joel P. Trachtman, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University 'Hylton's text provides an excellent account of antitrust and common law evolution. He extracts the essence of the landmark antitrust decisions to demonstrate their legal evolution in a very efficient way. His use of economics is not only appropriate to the subject matter; it is also appropriate for student readership in law and economics. The writing is clear and concise.' Roger D. Blair, University of Florida

Prefacep. xi
Economicsp. 1
Definitionsp. 1
Perfect Competition Versus Monopolyp. 9
Further Topicsp. 21
Law and Policyp. 27
Some Interpretation Issuesp. 28
Enacting the Antitrust Lawp. 30
What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do?p. 40
Enforcementp. 43
Optimal Enforcement Theoryp. 43
Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Lawsp. 47
Appendixp. 64
Cartelsp. 68
Cartelsp. 68
Conscious Parallelismp. 73
Conclusionp. 89
Development of Section 1 Doctrinep. 90
The Sherman Act Versus the Common Lawp. 90
Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rulep. 104
Conclusionp. 112
Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rulep. 113
The Case for Price Fixingp. 113
Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developmentsp. 116
Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rulep. 129
Agreementp. 132
The Development of Inference Doctrinep. 133
Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theoryp. 140
Facilitating Mechanismsp. 144
Data Dissemination Casesp. 145
Basing Point Pricing and Related Practicesp. 154
Basing Point Pricing: Economicsp. 160
Boycottsp. 166
Pre-Soconyp. 166
Post-Soconyp. 170
Post-BMI/Sylvaniap. 181
Conclusionp. 184
Monopolizationp. 186
Development of Section 2 Doctrinep. 186
Leveraging and Essential Facility Casesp. 202
Predatory Pricingp. 212
Conclusionp. 228
Powerp. 230
Measuring Market Powerp. 230
Determinants of Market Powerp. 235
Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophanep. 237
Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoap. 239
Measuring Power: Guidelinesp. 243
Attemptsp. 244
The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrinep. 244
Dangerous Probability Requirementp. 248
Vertical Restraintsp. 252
Resale Price Maintenancep. 252
Vertical Nonprice Restraintsp. 262
Manufacturer Retains Titlep. 267
Agreementp. 270
Tying and Exclusive Dealingp. 279
Introductionp. 279
Early Casesp. 284
Development of Per-Se Rulep. 286
Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rulep. 295
Technological Tyingp. 301
Exclusive Dealingp. 303
Appendixp. 307
Horizontal Mergersp. 311
Reasons for Merging and Implications for Lawp. 311
Horizontal Merger Lawp. 317
Conclusionp. 330
Appendixp. 330
Mergers, Vertical and Conglomeratep. 333
Vertical Mergersp. 333
Conglomerate Mergersp. 344
Concluding Remarksp. 351
Antitrust and the Statep. 352
Noerr-Pennington Doctrinep. 354
Parker Doctrinep. 371
Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrinesp. 375
Indexp. 379
Table of Contents provided by Rittenhouse. All Rights Reserved.

ISBN: 9780521793780
ISBN-10: 0521793785
Audience: Professional
Format: Paperback
Language: English
Number Of Pages: 430
Published: 7th April 2003
Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PR
Country of Publication: GB
Dimensions (cm): 22.8 x 15.2  x 2.2
Weight (kg): 0.59