Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue,Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics.
Part I. Problems for Indeterministic Accounts of Free Will
1.: Strawson/Libertarianism, Action and Self-Determination
2.: Nagel/The Problem of Autonomy
3.: Dennett/On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want
4.: Double/Libertarianism and Rationality
Part II. Indeterminism and Free Will: Contemporary Proposals
5.: Ginet/Reason and Explanation of Action: An Incompatibilist Account
6.: Chisholm/Agents, Causes and Events: The Problem of Free Will
7.: Nozik/Choice and Indeterminism
8.: Kane/Two Kinds of Incompatibilism
9.: Rowe/Two Concepts of Freedom
10.: O'Connor/Agent Causation
11.: Clarke/Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will
Part III. Indeterminism and the Extent of Free Will
12.: Peter Van Inwagen/When is the Will Free?
13.: Fischer and Ravizza/When the Will is Free?
Number Of Pages: 288
Published: 2nd February 1995
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 24.77 x 16.51
Weight (kg): 0.52