A Say in the End of the World

Introduction; PART I: JUST WAR AND ITS ENEMIES: Should war be humanized?; Weapons, targets, and the law; New uses for an old theory; The rules of just war; Non-combatant immunity and its critics; LESSONS OF THE PAST 1: APPEASEMENT: The lesson and its teachers; Arms and security; Appeasement or Armegeddon?; The anti-Soviet element; LESSONS OF THE PAST 2: STRATEGIC BOMBING: From 1917 to 1939: The theory; The moral background; From 1939 to 1945: The practice; The official version; Reprisals in ethics and law; conclusions; PART II: WEAPON FOR A FIRST CLASS NATION, 1941-1952: The decisive weapon; The bomb is made and used; Labour inherits the bomb; Strategic priorities; The importance of the Soviet threat - and the American presence; The British bomb becomes a reality; The silence of the moralists; JOINING THE 'H-CLUB', 1953-1956: The year of the H-bomb; Massive retaliation and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; Nuclear revisionism: graduated deterrence; conclusions; DETERRENCE ON THE CHEAP, 1957-1964: The new defence policy of 1957; Deterrence or defence?; A say in the end of the world: Britain's independent contribution; Macmillan and the test ban; The question of strategy; The symbolic value of possession; Labour and unilateralism; Unacceptable damage: How Polaris would be used; Moral critique, 1957-1964; conclusions; POLARIS AND DETENTE, 1965-1976: The changing outlook on defence; Flexible response; Detente and 'The continuing threat'; American actions - British responsibilities; Would Polaris always get through?; conclusions; CRISIS OVER MODERNIZATION, 1977-1987: The new insecurity; Long range theatre nuclear weapons; Replacing Polaris; The INF agreement; The new nuclear debate; conclusions; PART III: THE ETHICS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: Preventing war; The question of limits; Two kinds of deterrence; The limit of limits; The control of nuclear war; conclusions; CONCLUSIONS.