1300 187 187
How much does what we think depend on what we want? Descartes' much-discussed position has often been interpreted to mean that we hold an opinion as the result of a decision. In Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy, Araujo argues against this interpretation, asserting that we retain control over our opinions only through selective attention. Even for this limited control, however, Cartesian Scepticism implies the possibility of self-delusion, symbolized in the writings of Descartes by the figure of the evil god. Hence, the existence of an evil god would not only cast doubt on our claims to knowledge but also jeopardize our freedom. In this new interpretation, the Cartesian Scepticism, which is usually ascribed only epistemic significance, proves relevant for a fundamental moral question, that of human autonomy in general.
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Descartes' Theory of Judgement | p. 8 |
| Entertaining and Judging | p. 9 |
| Kinds of Thoughts: Ideas, Affections, and Judgements | p. 15 |
| Ideas: Picture-Like Thoughts and Propositions | p. 18 |
| Facultas Cognoscendi and Facultas Eligendi | p. 27 |
| Descartes' Ethics of Belief | p. 30 |
| Attention Voluntarism and Scepticism | p. 34 |
| Two Concepts of Freedom | p. 37 |
| Fourth Meditation: The Latin and The French Texts | p. 37 |
| Power of Choice and Spontaneous Assent | p. 39 |
| Arguments for Doxastic Voluntarism | p. 46 |
| Arguments for Attention Voluntarism | p. 49 |
| Freedom Before, and Freedom During the Action | p. 58 |
| The Concept of Attention | p. 62 |
| Scepticism and Free Will | p. 70 |
| Self-Deception as a Mental State | p. 73 |
| Dogmatic Self-Deception: The Regulae | p. 73 |
| Sceptical Self-Deception: The First Meditation | p. 80 |
| Imposition, Suspension of Judgement, and Freedom | p. 86 |
| The Meaning of Imponere in The First Meditation | p. 89 |
| Freedom, Scepticism and Early Modern Philosophy | p. 94 |
| Freedom, Autonomy, and Scepticism | p. 103 |
| Lack of Autonomy through Manipulation | p. 103 |
| Minimal Autonomy | p. 108 |
| Cogito and Autonomy | p. 111 |
| Autonomy and Epistemic Responsibility | p. 117 |
| Scepticism and Character Traits | p. 124 |
| The Science of Good Living | p. 131 |
| Interpretations of Descartes' Moral Theory | p. 131 |
| Deontological Approaches to Descartes' Moral Theory | p. 142 |
| Moral Certainty and Metaphysical Certainty | p. 145 |
| Scepticism and Everyday Life | p. 151 |
| The Moral Way of Knowing and the Science of Good Living | p. 157 |
| Descartes on Virtue Ethics | p. 163 |
| Descartes' Moral Theory and Virtue Ethics | p. 163 |
| The Moral Maxims | p. 166 |
| The First Maxim: Moral Paragons | p. 167 |
| The Second Maxim: The Virtue of Resolution | p. 186 |
| The Third Maxim: The Virtue of Prudence | p. 191 |
| The Fourth Maxim: The Examined Life | p. 196 |
| The Quest for Truth and The Highest Good | p. 199 |
| Conclusion | p. 204 |
| Bibliography | p. 207 |
| Index Nominum | p. 235 |
| Table of Contents provided by Blackwell. All Rights Reserved. |
ISBN: 9783110175387
ISBN-10: 311017538X
Series: Quellen & Studien Zur Philosophie
Audience:
Professional
For Ages: 22+ years old
Format:
Hardcover
Language:
English
Number Of Pages: 237
Published: 1st December 2002
Dimensions (cm): 23.0 x 15.5
x 1.9
Weight (kg): 0.484
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