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This book discusses how U.S. capabilities for interdicting invading ground forces in the Persian Gulf can be adapted over time to maintain the ability to achieve an early halt or to counter maneuver forces in other plausible campaigns. The authors emphasize exploratory analysis under massive uncertainty about political and military developments and about the detailed circumstances of conflict. The book documents a specialized model used for mission system analysis, which helps identify critical enablers of early-halt capability: deployment; immediate command-control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; ability to employ interdiction forces quickly; and weapon effectiveness. The United States should expect threatened or actual use of mass-casualty weapons against its forces and regional allies and enemy attempts to act quickly and with short warning. On the other hand, the threat's size and quality may be less than usually assumed. On the military side, the book characterizes parametrically the conditions for a successful early halt, thereby identifying high-priority strategic hedges, capability developments, and potential adaptations. The book considers joint forces for interdiction and synergy with rapidly employable ground forces. On the political side, the book notes the premium on continued forward basing, aggressive use of ambiguous warning, and long-range bombers. Continued enforcement of red-line constructs could greatly improve the likelihood of decisive response to ambiguous warning. Countering anti-access strategies would be enhanced by negotiating use of more distant bases and logistic preparation. It will be increasingly unwise to assume use of forward bases, even if technical analysis suggests that the bases could operate under attacks with mass-casualty weapons.
| Preface | p. iii |
| Figures | p. ix |
| Tables | p. xi |
| Summary | p. xiii |
| Acknowledgments | p. xxv |
| Acronyms | p. xxvii |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| Background and Objectives | p. 1 |
| The Early-Halt Problem | p. 1 |
| The Halt Problem as a Measure of More General Counter-Maneuver Capability | p. 1 |
| Monograph's Objectives | p. 2 |
| Approach: Use of Closed-Form Analytical Models | p. 2 |
| Structure of Monograph | p. 4 |
| Overview of the Halt Problem | p. 7 |
| Generic Geography | p. 7 |
| The Forces | p. 7 |
| Bases: Access and Vulnerability | p. 9 |
| The Concept of Red Lines | p. 9 |
| Significance of the Red Line Concept | p. 9 |
| Cautions | p. 10 |
| Defense Lines and Ground Forces | p. 10 |
| Analytics of the Elementary Halt Problem | p. 13 |
| Viewing the Problem as a Race | p. 13 |
| Blue's Employment Strategy and the Attacker's Resulting Movement Rate and Penetration | p. 14 |
| The Concept of Equivalent Shooters | p. 18 |
| Buildup of Shooters: Effects of Warning, Decision, and Access | p. 19 |
| Solving for the Number of D-Day Shooters, A[subscript 0] | p. 21 |
| Shooters Versus Time After D-Day: Average Deployment Rate | p. 23 |
| Shooter Effectiveness | p. 23 |
| Solving the Halt Problem for Interdiction In Depth (No Capacity Limits) | p. 25 |
| Basic Features of Solution | p. 25 |
| Limiting Forms | p. 27 |
| Solving the Halt Problem for Leading-Edge Interdiction (No Capacity Limits) | p. 29 |
| Solution Based on Slowing Effect Alone | p. 29 |
| Combined Solutions and Optimal Strategies | p. 33 |
| Implementation Notes | p. 35 |
| Significance of Delay Time (No Capacity Limits) | p. 36 |
| Effects of Access Constraints and Maximum Theater Capacity | p. 36 |
| Interdiction In Depth with a Theater Capacity | p. 37 |
| Leading-Edge Interdiction with Theater Capacity | p. 39 |
| Effects of a Theater Capacity Constraint | p. 40 |
| Indirect Effects of Mass-Destruction Weapons | p. 41 |
| Summary Insights | p. 42 |
| Losses to Air Defense and Tradeoffs Between Losses and Halt Time | p. 45 |
| Solutions for In-Depth Interdiction (Ignoring Losses) | p. 45 |
| Basic Analytics | p. 45 |
| An Illustrative Case | p. 47 |
| A Second Illustrative Case | p. 48 |
| Solutions Covering All Time Orderings | p. 49 |
| Solutions for the Leading-Edge Strategy (Ignoring Losses) | p. 52 |
| General Comments | p. 52 |
| Halt Distance | p. 56 |
| Solutions That Include Losses to Air Defenses | p. 56 |
| General Comments | p. 56 |
| Effects on the Time Maximum Theater Capacity Is Reached | p. 58 |
| In-Depth and Leading-Edge Interdiction with Losses | p. 59 |
| Results for an Optimum Strategy | p. 60 |
| Optimizing the Wait Time | p. 60 |
| Implementation | p. 62 |
| Summary Insights | p. 62 |
| Ground Forces at A Defense Line | p. 67 |
| Overview | p. 67 |
| Ground Forces as a Small Source of Daily Attrition and Disruption | p. 67 |
| Ground Forces at a Defense Line | p. 67 |
| Motivations and Concerns | p. 67 |
| A Modularization That More Fully Respects the Subtleties of Close Combat | p. 68 |
| The Mathematics of the Defense-Line Calculations | p. 69 |
| Solutions | p. 70 |
| Factors Reflecting Weapons Supply, C[superscript 2], C[superscript 4]isr, Terrain, and Enemy Maneuver Tactics | p. 73 |
| Representing Limited Supplies of Best Weapons | p. 73 |
| Calculating Exhaustion Time | p. 73 |
| Treating Exhaustion Time T[subscript exh] as an Exogenous Input | p. 74 |
| Calculating Halt Time and Halt Distance with Limited Best Weapons | p. 74 |
| An Approximation to Reduce Dimensionality | p. 74 |
| Identifying the "Chunks": The Cases for Which Separate Formulas Are Needed | p. 75 |
| Solutions for the In-Depth Strategy | p. 75 |
| Solutions for the Slowing Effect of the Leading-Edge Strategy | p. 81 |
| Reflecting Command and Control and Other Effects, Such as Those of Terrain and Maneuver Tactics | p. 82 |
| Command-Control Gain-Competence Time | p. 82 |
| Problems with Early C[superscript 4]ISR | p. 84 |
| Reflecting Early C[superscript 2] and ISR Problems | p. 84 |
| Effects of C[superscript 2], ISR, Terrain, and Maneuver Tactics on Shooter Effectiveness | p. 84 |
| Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty | p. 87 |
| Purpose of Chapter | p. 87 |
| Risk and Uncertainty for the Early-Halt Problem | p. 87 |
| Reviewing the Significance of Early-Halt Capability | p. 87 |
| Source of Risk (Factors Reducing the Probability of an Early Halt) | p. 88 |
| The Upside of Uncertainty | p. 88 |
| Types of Risk | p. 89 |
| Structuring Uncertainty Analysis: the Concept of a Scenario Space (or Assumptions Space) | p. 90 |
| Enabling Scenario-Space Analysis with a Multiresolution Model | p. 92 |
| MRMPM Depiction | p. 92 |
| The Composite Model and Simplifications | p. 93 |
| Illustrative Scenario Spaces and Experimental Plans | p. 96 |
| Parametric Exploration | p. 97 |
| Displaying Results of Parametric Exploration | p. 100 |
| Stochastic Features and Probabilistic Exploration | p. 105 |
| Interface Models for Dealing with Cross-Cutting Factors Such as C[superscript 4]ISR in Exploratory Analysis | p. 111 |
| Using Interface Models for Gaming | p. 114 |
| Illustrative Analysis Toward Adaptive Strategy | p. 117 |
| Introduction | p. 117 |
| Taking a Mission-System Perspective | p. 117 |
| Basic Concepts | p. 117 |
| An Example of Mission-System Analysis | p. 119 |
| A Requirements Diagram | p. 122 |
| Summary on Mission-System View | p. 123 |
| Selected Observations from Analysis | p. 123 |
| Preventing a Quick Takeover | p. 123 |
| Movement Rates | p. 123 |
| D-Day Shooters | p. 125 |
| Protracted SEAD, Delays in C[superscript 4]ISR, and Staged Operations | p. 126 |
| Shooter Effectiveness | p. 126 |
| Number of Top-Quality Munitions | p. 127 |
| Losses to Air Defenses | p. 128 |
| Deployment Rates | p. 129 |
| Anti-Access Problems and Weapons of Mass Destruction | p. 129 |
| Effects of Delayed Access to Regional Bases | p. 132 |
| Slowing Movement: Effects of Force Employment Strategy | p. 132 |
| Slowing and Confronting: Immediate Air Strikes and the Potential Use of Early Arriving Ground Forces | p. 136 |
| Improving Anti-Armor Operations Before SEAD Is Complete: The Value of Partial Stealth | p. 136 |
| Effects of Probabilistic Calculations | p. 138 |
| Summary Results of Exploratory Analysis | p. 140 |
| Possible Adaptations to Improve Outcomes | p. 140 |
| Appendix | |
| Representing Different Shooter Types | p. 147 |
| Summary of Variables Used in Models | p. 151 |
| Summary Description of Exhalt 1.5 | p. 157 |
| An Approximation for Cases in Which T[subscript exh] Occurs Before T[subscript wait] | p. 161 |
| General Formulas for Leading-Edge Strategy | p. 163 |
| Notes on Implementation in Analytica | p. 179 |
| Bibliography | p. 185 |
| Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved. |
ISBN: 9780833031075
ISBN-10: 0833031074
Audience:
Professional
Format:
Paperback
Language:
English
Number Of Pages: 221
Published: January 2002
Dimensions (cm): 27.9 x 21.6
x 1.3
Weight (kg): 0.526