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Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.
What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.
|The Origins of Ownership Structure|
|The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities||p. 17|
|Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality||p. 55|
|Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership Concentration in Canada||p. 81|
|Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter?||p. 105|
|The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership|
|Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders||p. 139|
|Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations||p. 177|
|Waiting for the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression||p. 201|
|Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts||p. 247|
|Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership|
|Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance||p. 265|
|Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights||p. 295|
|Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease?||p. 319|
|Name Index||p. 375|
|Subject Index||p. 381|
|Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.|
Series: National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report
Number Of Pages: 392
Published: 1st August 2000
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Country of Publication: US
Dimensions (cm): 23.8 x 16.4 x 2.8
Weight (kg): 0.68